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Permanent Neutrality and Collective
Security: The Case of Switzerland and
the United Nations Sanctions Against
Southern Rhodesia
Boleslaw A. Boczek
MONG THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS facing a col-
lective security organization is, on the one hand, the determina-
tion of the extent to which its members - and perhaps even non-
members - are required to participate in the coercive measures
directed against the source of
the threat to the peace, breach
THE AUTHOR: BOLESLAW A. BoCZEK of the peace, or act of aggres-
(LL.M., S.J.D., Jagiellonian University,
Krakow, Poland; Ph.D. in political sci- Sion, and on the other hand,
ence, Harvard University), formerly ad- the determination of the de-
viser to the United Nations Economic gree to which claims to non-
Commission for Latin America and Re-
search Associate in Law at Harvard Law participation are permissible
School, is currently a professor of po- from the point of view of mini-
litical science at Kent State University,
Kent, Ohio. mnum world public order.' In
the traditional international
system of the balance of power,
when war was a legitimate attribute of sovereign nation-states not
to be judged by third parties, nonparticipation in hostilities, usually
formalized in the legal status of "neutrality," was an accepted insti-
tution of public international law. Following the breakdown of the
balance of power system, the League of Nations and then the
United Nations made the first attempts to base international rela-
tions on the principle of collective security under which unlawful
use of force by one nation is to be met by the combined force of all
other members of the community of nations.'
The emergence of a universal international organization with
the primary objective of institutionalizing collective response to in-
ternational violence, in combination with the outlawing of war as an
I See McDoUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 68
(1961).
2 For a penetrating analysis of collective security as an approach to peace, see
CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ch. 12 (3d rev. ed. 1964).
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instrument of national policy by the Pact of Paris of 1928,3 has
raised the question of the compatibility of the traditional institution
of neutrality with the system of collective security. The issue is of
particular relevance with regard to the status of the so called "per-
manent" or "perpetual" neutrality under which a state is obliged
under international law not only not to resort to war except in self-
defense, but also has certain peacetime duties, such as the duty of
abstaining from any treaty obligations that might compromise its
permanent neutrality. A good deal of scholarly effort has been ex-
pended in the examination of the compatibility of neutrality with
the system of collective security.4 Although in purely abstract terms
3 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 27, 1928,46 Star. 2343 (1928), T.S. No. 796,94 L.N.T.S. 57.
4 The problem has been dealt with in international law treatises, commentaries on
the League of Nations Covenant and the Charter of the United Nations, studies of
neutrality generally, works examining the permanent neutrality of Switzerland and
Austria, and in special studies devoted specifically to the relationship between neutral-
ity and collective security. Among the last mentioned studies are: Lauterpacht, Neutrality
and Collective Security, 2 POLITICA 133 (1936); Guggenheim, La s~curitg collective
et le problme de la neutralitg, 2 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES
RECHT 9 (1945); Guggenheim, Das Sicherheitssystem der Vereinten Nationen und die
schweizerische Neutralitat, 13 NEUE SCHWEIZER RUNDSCHAU (Zurich) 391, 492
(1945-46); GUGGENHEIM, VOLKERBUND, DUMBARTON OAKS UND DIE SCHWEIZERIS.
CHE NEUTRALIT.AT (1945); Guggenheim, Die v6lkerrechtliche Zwangsvollstreckung
und der Status der permanenten Neutralitdt, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Apr. 9, 1967, Blatt
7 [hereinafter citations are to international edition]; Lalive, International Organization
and Neutrality, 24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 72 (1947); PAPE, NEUTRALITXT UND KOL-
LEKTIVE SICHERHEIT (ZUGLEICH EIN BEITRAG ZUR DOKTRIN DER QUALIFIZIERTEN
NEUTRALITAT) (1952) [Dr. Jur. dissertation, University of Hamburg, Germany];
Komarnicki, The Problem of Neutrality under the United Nations Charter, 38 TRANS-
ACT. GROT. Soc'Y [1952] 77 (1953); Taubenfeld, International Actions and Neutral-
itY, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 377 (1953); Chaumont, Nations Unies et neutralitg, in 89
HAGUE ACADEMY, RECUEIL DES COURS 1 (1956 I); Verdross, Neutrality within the
Framework of the United Nations Organisation, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 410 (1958);
Bfiutigam, Die Neutralisation: Unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Mitgliedschaft
eines neutralisierten Staates in einem System kollektiver Sicherheit (1960) [mimeo-
graphed Dr. Jur. dissertation, University of Bonn, Germany]; HAUG, NEUTRALITAT
UND VOLKERGEMEINSCHAFT (1962); Fuchs, Die Stellung eines permanent neutralen
Staates innerhalb des V61kerbunds und der Organisation der Vereinten Nationen, erlaiu-
tert am Beispiel der Schweiz und Osterreichs (1964) [mimeographed Dr. Jur. disserta-
tion, University of Wiirzburg, Germany]; Van der Mensbrugghe, Neutraliteit en
lidmaatschap van de Vereinigte Naties, 27 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD (Antwerp) 1145
(1964). For the Soviet and other Eastern European views, see, e.g., Vigor, The Soviet
Conception of Neutrality, 15 BULLETIN OF INST. FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR, No.
11, at 3-18 (Nov. 1968); Durdenevskii, Neitralitet v sisteme kollektivnoi bezopastnosti
[Neutrality in the System of Collective Security], SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO,
No. 8, at 81 (1957); Hajdu, La neutralitM dans le syst~me des Nations Unies, 1 ACTA
JURIDIA ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM HUNGARICAE (Budapest) (fasc. 1-2), 29
(1959); Penkov, Neutralitet i kolektivna sigurnost [Neutrality and Collective Security],
11 IZVESTIIA NA INSTITUTA NA PRAvNI NAUKI (Sophia) 225 (1960); Piontek, Trwala
neutralnosc a system bezpieczenstwa zbiorowego ONZ [Permanent Neutrality and the
U.N. System of Collective Security], 17 PANSTWO I PRAWO (Warsaw) 786 (1962).
For a Yugoslav view, see PETKOVIC, NEUTRALNOST U POLITCKOM I PRAVNOM POR-
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neutrality is antithetical to collective security, nonparticipation in
enforcement measures has proven permissible in practice under both
the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the
United Nations due to political reality and gaps in the instruments
incorporating the collective security agreements. Under the United
Nations, however, the discussion of the relationship between a per-
manently neutral state and collective security had to be largely aca-
demic for 20 years because no collective security measures under
chapter VII of the Charter were ordered by the Security Council.
Then on December 16, 1966,5 for the first time in the history of the
United Nations, sanctions were imposed under article 41 of the
Charter in an attempt to bring down the illegal rebel regime of Ian
Smith in Southern Rhodesia. The Rhodesian case has offered a
challenge to the collective security mechanism of the United Na-
tions, and from this point of view it has been appraised in a number
of scholarly studies.' At the same time, however, the Security Coun-
cil resolution on mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia has provided
the first opportunity to test in practice ideas about the relationship
between the United Nations collective security system and the status
of permanent neutrality. The case of Switzerland is especially in-
teresting since it is the country with the longest and unique record
of neutrality and the model for the neutralization of neighboring
Austria. Switzerland has not - unlike Austria and Laos - be-
come a member of the United Nations because of concern about the
apparent incompatibility of permanent neutrality with membership
in an international organization requiring participation in collective
economic, political, and military coercive measures against other
ETKU UJEDINJENIH NACIJA [NEUTRAUTY IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL ORDER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS] (1966).
5 U.N. Doc S/RES/232 (1966); 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 654 (1967).
6 See MARSHALL, CRISIS OVER RHODESIA - A SKEPTICAL VIEW (1967); Balfour,
Rhodesien - eine Herausforderung fiar Grossbritannien und die Vereinten Nationen,
22 EUROPA-ARCHIV 135 (1967); Cefkin, The Rhodesian Question at the United Na-
tions, 22 INT'L ORG. 649 (1968); Fenwick, When Is There a Threat to Peace? - Rho-
desia, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 753 (1967); Halderman, Some Legal Aspects of Sanctions in
the Rhodesian Case, 17 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 672 (1968); Higgins, International Law,
Rhodesia, and the U.N., 23 WORLD TODAY 94 (1967); McDougal & Reisman, Rhode-
sia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L
L 1 (1968); Pierson-Mathy, La crise rhoddsienne devant les Nations Unies, 11 ANNALES
DE LA FACULTh DE DROIT DE LIOGE 399 (1967); Robinowitz, U.N. Application of
Selective, Mandatory Sanctions against Rhodesia: A Brief Legal and Political Analysis, 7
VA. J. INT'L L. 147 (1967); Schramm, Das Eingreifen der Vereinten Nationen in den
Rhodesienkonflikt, 16 VEREINTE NATIONEN 144 (1968). For a detailed review of
the Rhodesian case including the basic source materials, see 2 CHAYES, EHRLICH &
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY
COURSE 1313-1402 (1968) (Problem XVII: United Nations Sanctions: Rhodesia).
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states.' The purpose of this article is to examine, using the example
of Switzerland, the relationship between permanent neutrality and
collective security against the background of the mandatory enforce-
ment measures ordered by the Security Council in the Rhodesian
situation," and to formulate certain general ideas concerning the
compatibility of these two concepts and, in more general terms, the
membership of permanently neutral states in the United Nations.
I. THE UNITED NATIONS MANDATORY
SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA
The background of the Rhodesian crisis, including the events
leading to the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by the
Ian Smith regime9 and the United Nations consideration of the
Rhodesian question prior to the initiation of the mandatory sanc-
tions, is beyond the scope of this inquiry.1" Suffice it to say that
prior to December 16, 1966, the question had been considered by
various organs of the United Nations," principally the General As-
sembly, the General Assembly's 24-member Special Committee on
the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples,' 2 and the Security Council. For the purposes of the present
examination it is relevant, however, to mention Security Council
Resolution No. 216 of November 12, 1965, which, following the
recommendation of the General Assembly, 3 condemned the UDI
and "[called] upon all states not to recognize this illegal racist
7 See text accompanying notes 81-82 infra.
8 See Bindschedler, Das Problem der Beteiligung der Schweiz an Sanktionen der
Vereinigten Nationen besonders im Palle Rhodesiens, 28 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLAN-
DISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1 (1968). For a study of the
Rhodesian sanctions from the point of view of the permanent neutrality of Austria, see
Zemanek, Das Problem der Beteiligung des immerwdbirend neutralen 6sterreicbs an
Sanktionen der Vereinten Nationen, besonders im Falle Rhodesiens, 28 ZEITSCHRIFT
FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 16 (1968).
9 For the text of the UDI (Nov. 11, 1965), see 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 230-31
(1966).
10 For a concise summary of the events, see Cefkin, supra note 6, at 649-61; Mc-
Dougal & Reisman, supra note 6, at 1-3.
11 For a convenient summary of the consideration of the Rhodesian problem before
the various organs of the United Nations in the final stages prior to December 16, 1966,
and documentary reference, see Y.B. OF THE UNITED NATIONS 117-34 (1965), and id.
at 94-117 (1966).
12G.A. Res. 1654 (XVI), 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/5100
(1961).
13 Contained in Resolution No. 2024 (XX) of November 11, 1965; U.N. Doc.
A/2024 (XX) (1965); 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 924 (1966).
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minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from render-
ing any assistance to this illegal regime. ' 14
On November 20, 1965, the Security Council in Resolution 217
determined that the situation was extremely grave, that its continu-
ance in time constituted a threat to international peace and security,
and called, inter alia, for voluntary economic and political sanctions
against the illegal Rhodesian regime. As in Resolution No. 216,
the call was addressed to "all states" irrespective of membership in
the United Nations and without any regard to the permanent neu-
trality of Switzerland or Austria.' 5 The resolution called upon all
states "not to recognize this illegal authority and not to entertain
any diplomatic or other relations with this illegal authority," and
to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the
illegal regime and, in particular, to desist from providing it with
arms, equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in
order to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, in-
cluding an embargo on oil and petroleum products.' "
Since Resolution 217 proved inadequate for the enforcement of
the oil embargo, the Security Council in its Resolution No. 221 of
April 9, 1966, determined for the first time that the situation con-
stituted a threat to the peace and, inter alia, authorized the United
Kingdom to use force if necessary to prevent oil from reaching Beira
(Portuguese Mozambique) from which it could reach its Rhodesian
destination. The resolution called upon "all states" to ensure the
diversion of any of their vessels reasonably believed to be carrying
oil destined for Rhodesia which might be en route for Beira."7 As
the Council's efforts and the measures taken by the United King-
dom failed to bring the rebellion to an end, the Security Council
made the momentous decision on December 16, 1966, to impose
selected mandatory economic sanctions upon Southern Rhodesia -
that is, to apply the enforcement measures under article 41 of the
Charter of the United Nations not involving the use of armed
forces. Acting in accordance with article 39 of the Charter, the Se-
curity Council decided that the situation in Rhodesia constituted a
threat to international peace and security and, in accordance with ar-
ticle 25 and 41, ordered all state members to prevent the importing
14 U.N. Doc. S/RES/216 (1965); 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 924 (1966) (emphasis
added).
"5The same formulation is found in G.A. Res. 2022, Nov. 5, 1965; U.N. GAOR
Supp. 14, at 54; U.N. Doc. A/RES/2022 (XX) (1965); 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 922 (1966).
16 U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (1965); 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 924 (1966).
17U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966); 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 925 (1966).
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into their territories of selected Rhodesian raw materials and prod-
ucts, and to prevent sale or shipment by their nationals of arms,
ammunition and other military material, aircraft and motor vehicles,
and oil and oil products. All states were called upon "not to render
financial or other economic aid to the illegal racist regime in South-
ern Rhodesia." States not members of the United Nations were spe-
cifically urged, "having regard to the principles stated in Article 2
of the United Nations Charter, . . . to act in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 2 of the present resolution," that is, the de-
cision to impose selected economic sanctions. The Secretary Gen-
eral was asked to report no later than March 1, 1967, on the progress
of the implementation of the resolution.18
Although the selected mandatory sanctions resulted in severe
cuts in Rhodesia's traditional exports and imports, the sanctions did
not have a decisive negative effect upon her foreign trade and did
not cause the collapse of the Rhodesian economy because of loop-
holes provided by South Africa and (to a lesser extent) by Portugal,
the two countries which, in violation of article 25 of the United Na-
tions Charter, have become Rhodesia's major trade partners. 9 To
18 U.N. Sec. C. Res. 232 (Dec. 16, 1966; U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (1966); Y.B. OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 116 (1966); 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 654 (1967). The Resolution
was adopted by 11 votes in favor to 0 against, with 4 abstentions (Bulgaria, France,
Mali, USSR). Although two permanent members of the Security Council abstained, the
decision was valid because in the practice of the Council continued since 1946 volun-
tary abstention of a permanent member is not considered a veto. See Stavropoulos, The
Practice of Voluntary Abstentions by Permanent Members of the Security Council under
Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 737
(1967). See also Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention in the Post-1965
Amendment Phase and Its Impact on Article 25 of the Charter, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 315
(1968).
19 For Rhodesian foreign trade statistics, see the Reports of the Secretary General to
the Security Council on the progress of the implementation of Resolution 232 (1966),
containing replies of governments on the measures taken in accordance with the resolu-
tion; U.N. Doc. S/7781 (Feb. 21, 1967), and Adds. 1-5, especially Add. 5, June 15,
1968. See also Issues before the 23rd General Assembly, INT'L CONC., Sept. 1968/No.
569, at 70-77. For the Swiss trade with Rhodesia, see note 26 infra. For an assessment
of the effects of the sanctions upon Rhodesian economy, see Bowman, Rhodesia since
UDI, 12 AFRICA REPORT, Feb. 1967, at 5. For the methods used to circumvent the sanc-
tions, see Sutcliffe, Rhodesian Trade since UDI, 23 WORLD TODAY 418 (1967). See
also CURTIN & MURRAY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND RHODESIA (1967); Curtin,
Rhodesian Economic Development under Sanctions and the Long Haul, 67 AFRICAN
AFFAIRS 100 (1968); McKinnell, Assessing the Economic Impact of Sanctions against
Rhodesia, 67 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 227 (1968). For a Swiss assessment of the sanctions,
see Rhodesiens Wirtschaft und die Sanktionen der UN - Begrenzte Auswirkungen,
Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Aug. 30, 1968, at 17. For a theoretical analysis of the effects
of the Rhodesian sanctions, see Galtung, On the Effects of International Economic Sanc-
tions - With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia, 19 WORLD POL. 378 (1967). For
a comparative content analysis of the decisions of the League of Nations to apply sanc-
tions against Italy in 1935 and the decision of the British Government to apply sanctions
against Rhodesia in 1965, see F. Hoffmann, The Function of Economic Sanctions: A
(Vol. 1: 75
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increase pressure upon the Smith regime, the Security Council, tak-
ing note of General Assembly's Resolution 2262 (XXII) of No-
vember 3, 1967, 20 adopted a unanimous resolution on May 29,
1968, imposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions upon Rhode-
sia under article 41 of the United Nations Charter.2 ' The Resolu-
tion reaffirmed the determination that the situation in Southern
Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security
and, inter alia, ordered all member states to prevent the importing
of all commodities and goods originating in Southern Rhodesia,
any activities by their nationals or in their territories that could
promote the exportation of Rhodesian commodities, shipment in ves-
sels or aircraft or carriage by land transport facilities across their ter-
ritories of any Rhodesian products, and the sale or supply of any
commodities to any person in Rhodesia (except for supplies in-
tended for medical, humanitarian, and educational purposes). The
Council further ordered all members (1) to prohibit the flow of
funds for investment or any other financial or economic resources
to the Rhodesian regime and enterprises (except payments exclu-
sively for pensions or strictly medical, humanitarian or educational
purposes), (2) to ban the entry into their territories, save on excep-
tional humanitarian grounds, of persons travelling on a Southern
Rhodesian passport, and to take all possible measures to prevent the
entry into their territories of persons ordinarily resident in Southern
Rhodesia who had furthered the illegal regime or any activities cal-
culated to evade the enforcement measures ordered by the Security
Council, and (3) to end all air line services with Rhodesia. In ad-
dition to these mandatory measures, the Council called upon the
members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies to
take all possible measures to stop emigration to Rhodesia, and re-
quested them "to take all possible further action under Article 41 of
the Charter to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia, not ex-
cluding any of the measures provided in that Article. ' 22  The
Comparative Analysis, 4 J. PEACE RESEARCH 140 (1967). For a general theoretical
consideration of economic sanctions, see Wallensteen, Characteristics of Economic Sanc-
tions, 5 J. PEACE RESEARCH 248 (1968).
2 0 U.N. Doc. A/RES/2262 (XXII) (1967).
21 U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (1968); 5 UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, June 1968, at 36-
38.
22 The implementation of this call would result in complete interruption of all rela-
tions with Rhodesia, including rail, sea, air, postal, and other means of communication,
and the severance of diplomatic relations if any should exist between a U.N. mem-
ber and Rhodesia. So far no country has recognized the Smith regime. All nations had
been called upon not to entertain any diplomatic or other relations (e.g. consular rela-
tions) with the Rhodesian regime in Resolution No. 217 (1965). Switzerland has con-
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Council emphasized the need for the withdrawal of all consular and
trade representations in Rhodesia. Following its previous resolu-
tions, the Council urged, "having regard to the principles stated in
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the
United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of the pres-
ent resolution." Members of the United Nations or of the Special-
ized Agencies were called to report to the Secretary General by
August 1, 1968, on measures taken to implement the resolution."
A committee was established to examine the reports and seek infor-
mation on the implementation of the resolution.24
The wide sweep of the economic sanctions has forced the Rhode-
sian regime to look for further loopholes to sustain its foreign trade,
but so far there has been no conclusive evidence that the Smith re-
gime has been forced to accept a negotiated settlement with the Brit-
ish government or that the Rhodesian economy is nearing collapse.28
sular and trade representations in Southern Rhodesia. See Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Sept.
6, 1968, at 33.
23 The Secretary General was requested to report to the Security Council on the prog-
ress of the implementation of the resolution not later than Sept. 1, 1968. On the Report
of the Secretary General, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1968, at 9, col. 1. The report con-
tains replies from 57 countries including nonmember states (South Korea and the Ger-
man Federal Republic) and from several specialized agencies.
24 For the composition of the Committee, see 5 UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Aug.-
Sept. 1968, at 77. The Committee adopted its first report on December 30, 1968. See
UN MONTHLY CRONICLE, Jan. 1969, at 25.
25 Direct negotiations between Prime Minister Wilson and Ian Smith in October
1968 failed to bring any solution to the crisis. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1968, at 1, cols.
2-3. For an account of the economic and political situation in Rhodesia, see Worrall,
'Our Independence Is Real' Says Ian Smith - But he faces economic attack, guerrilla
attack, right-wing attack, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 40.
The Security Council Committee on Southern Rhodesia found in its Report of
December 30, 1968, that the trade of that territory remained quite substantial in mid-
1968 despite the Council's resolutions of 1965 and 1966. Data for the second half of
1968 were not sufficient to analyse the effectiveness of the implementation of Resolu-
tion 253 (1968). The report indicated that, besides South Africa and Portugal, there
were some other countries which continued to trade with Southern Rhodesia. 6 UN
MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Feb. 1969, at 4. According to The Economist, in spite of the
tightening of the sanctions regulations by a number of countries, there exist many loop-
holes allowing Rhodesia to circumvent the sanctions, particularly in the area of exports
from that territory which are re-routed through South Africa, Mozambique and else-
where under false labels of origin. See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, QUAR-
TERLY ECONOMIC REVIEWS: ECONOMIC REvIEW OF RHODESIA, ZAMBIA, MALAWI,
No. 1, Feb. 1969, at 3-4.
In its resolution adopted on November 7, 1968, the General Assembly, noting that
the sanctions had not produced the desired results, condemned the governments of South
Africa and Portugal and all other governments which rendered assistance to Southern
Rhodesia and urged the Security Council to widen the scope of the sanctions by includ-
ing all the measures laid down in article 41 of the Charter and to impose sanctions on the
above mentioned countries. G.A. Res. 2383 (XXIII), A/RES/2383 (XXIII) (Nov. 8,
1968); 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1402 (1968).
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II. THE Swiss REACTION
The consideration of the Rhodesian situation by the United Na-
tions has been followed with keen interest in Switzerland because
the Swiss government and public opinion, recalling the awkward
experience of the sanctions against Italy in 1935, realized that the
Rhodesian crisis might eventually put to test, as it did, Switzerland's
status of permanent neutrality and confront it with the task of rec-
onciling the principles of neutrality with the spirit of international
solidarity and participation in collective enforcement measures de-
signed to suppress a threat to international peace and security. Also,
Swiss reaction to the Rhodesian sanctions must be contemplated
against the background of the "grand debate" on the question
whether Switzerland should become a member of the United Na-
tions. The culmination of this debate, which absorbed Swiss parlia-
mentary bodies, news media, and all strata of Swiss society, coin-
cided in time with the Rhodesian crisis." As noted below, the
Rhodesian resolutions of the Security Council were not without ef-
fect upon Swiss attitude toward a possible membership in the United
Nations.28 The following paragraphs will briefly present the Swiss
response to the recommendations of the Security Council under its
Resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965) and to the call of the
Council to join in imposing mandatory selective, and subsequently
26 Switzerland does not have any major interest in trade relations with Rhodesia.
The Swiss share in the Rhodesian exports amounts to about 1 percent, and the Swiss
exports to Rhodesia make only 0.5 percent of total Rhodesian exports. See Statement of
the Swiss Federal Council of Feb. 13, 1967, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Feb. 15, 1967,
Blatt 1. In 1965 the Swiss share of imports from Rhodesia amounted to $5,678,000 out
of the Rhodesian total of $460,000,000 of exports. Swiss exports to Rhodesia totalled
$1,641,000 out of $334,000,000 value of total Rhodesian imports. See Sixth Report
of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/7781/Add. 5 (June 13, 1968), and Table 1 in
Issues Before the 23rd General Assembly, INT'L CONC., Sept. 1968/No. 569, at 74.
27 Among the multitude of opinions expressed in this debate, see articles by Bretscher,
Wahlen, Schwarz, Guggenheim, Hofer, Frei, Kreibaum, Reck, Streuli, Schindler, and
Luchsinger, written for Neue Zircher Zeitung in January and February 1966, and
published in a separate pamphlet, KANN UND SOLL DIE SCHWEIZ DEN VEREINIGTEN
NATIONEN BEITRETEN? (Feb. 1966). See also Bretscher, Belebtes Gespriich fiber
die schweizerische Aussenpolitik, Neue Zircher Zeitung, Aug. 6, 1966, Blatt 4; Stadlin,
Die Schiveiz und die Vereinigten Nationen, Neue Zircher Zeitung, Dec. 10, 1966,
Blatt 14; Bindschedler-Robert, Die Schweiz und die internationalen Organisationen,
Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Dec. 22, 1966, Blatt 13; Liuchinger, Fiir eine aktive schwveizeri-
sche Aussenpolitik - Ein Diskussionsbeitrag, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Jan. 10, 1967, Blatt
4; Schneeberger, Rechtliche Uberlegungen zur UN-Beitritts-Frage, Neue Ziircher Zeit-
ung, Feb. 8, 1967, Blatt 4. See also articles in 33 EUROPA (Basle) (Oct. 1966), the is-
sue devoted exclusively to the problem of Switzerland and the United Nations, in DIE
SCHWEIZ IN DER VOLKERGEMEINSCHAFT (a quarterly bulletin of the Swiss Society
for the United Nations), and many others.
28 See text accompanying note 98 infra.
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comprehensive, economic sanctions under Resolutions 221 (1966)
and 253 (1968) respectively.
At the request of the government of the United Kingdom, and
responding to the United Nations call for voluntary measures
against Rhodesia, the Swiss Federal Council imposed restrictions
upon imports from Southern Rhodesia, freezing them at the level of
the current "normal trade" (courant normal). Under these restric-
tions imports became subjected to licenses obtainable only to the
amount of the import figures of 1964 or 1965.29 In other words,
Switzerland did not show readiness to break off economic relations
with Rhodesia as recommended by the Security Council, but was
willing to prevent the use of Switzerland as a channel for circum-
venting the sanctions implemented by other countries. In addition
to import restrictions, Switzerland banned export of war materials to
Southern Rhodesia and blocked the deposits of the Rhodesian Re-
serve Bank in the Swiss National Bank. 30
The decision of the Security Council of December 16, 1966, on
mandatory selective economic sanctions was transmitted to the Swiss
Federal Council in the note of the Secretary General of December
17, 1966, requesting the Swiss government to observe the decision. 1
In order to emphasize that Switzerland was not legally bound by the
Resolution of the Security Council, the Federal Council did not for-
mally answer the Secretary General's note. On the other hand, in
its public statement of February 13, 1967,32 without entering into
the question of the legality of Resolution 232, 33 the Federal Council
29 Decree of the Federal Council, Dec. 17, 1965, [1965) AMTLICHE SAMMLUNG
1205; Order of the Federal Economic Department, Dec. 17, 1965, [1965] AMTLICHE
SAMMLUNG 1207. See also the press release of the Federal Council of Dec. 17,
1965, reprinted in part in Bindschedler, supra note 8, at 13-14. The doctrine of
courant normal had been applied by Switzerland as part of the sanctions against Italy
under the League of Nations. See text accompanying note 77 infra.
30 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1967, at 3, col. 4. Under the Swiss Constitution (art.
41), manufacture, purchase, sale, as well as import and export of war materials, require
the Federal Government's license.
31 The full text of the Note is reproduced in German in Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Dec.
24, 1966, Blatt 1. A further note of the Secretary General of February 13, 1967, con-
tained a questionnaire on monthly imports and exports of the commodities under sanc-
tions. See U.N. Doc. S/7781, Ann. 1 (1967).
32 The full text of the statement is reprinted in Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Feb. 15,
1967, Blatt 1. See also Bindschedler, supra note 8, at 14-15.
33 The Security Council's action in the Rhodesian case has occasioned some doubt
and criticism in both the United States and Switzerland. See, e.g., Fenwick, supra note
6; MARSHALL, supra note 6. For Swiss doubts, see, e.g., Guggenheim, Die vdlker.
rethtliche Zwangsvollstreckung und der Status der permanenten Neutralitit, Neue Ziur-
cher Zeitung, Apr. 9, 1967, Blatt 7 (expressing doubts on grounds of domestic jurisdic-
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declared that "for reasons of principle, Switzerland as a neutral
state cannot submit itself to mandatory sanctions of the United Na-
tions," but that the Swiss government was nonetheless willing "to
take care that the Swiss territory offers no possibilities for the
Rhodesian trade to evade the sanction measures of the Security
Council." Referring to its measures of December 1965,"4 taken by
Switzerland "in an autonomous way and without recognition of any
legal duty, ' 85 the Swiss statement further noted that notwithstand-
ing the negligible scope of the Swiss-Rhodesian trade the Federal
Council had decided to restrict the import of commodities from
Rhodesia to the average of the years 1964, 1965, and 1966.86 Con-
cerning products subject to embargo, the Swiss statement pointed
out that Switzerland had no oil of its own and as a result did not ex-
port oil or petroleum products to Rhodesia "either directly or indi-
rectly," nor did it export motor vehicles or aircraft or their parts to
Rhodesia. However, the ban on export of war materials and the
blocking of the Rhodesian Bank deposits continued in force.
The position of Switzerland remained unchanged following the
imposition of the comprehensive economic sanctions by the Security
Council on May 29, 1968. In its "autonomous statement" of Sep-
tember 4, 1968, in reaction to the note of the Secretary General of
June 7, 1968, the Federal Council again refused "for reasons of
principle" to participate in the economic sanctions against Rhodesia
or to undertake other voluntary measures requested by the Security
Council. On the other hand, Switzerland was willing, without rec-
tion); Editorial, Kann sich die Schweiz heteiligen?, Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Dec. 24,
1966, Blatt 1 (questioning the Security Council's determination that the situation in
Rhodesia represented a threat to peace); Bindschedler, supra note 8, at 10-11. See also
similar criticism by members of the Swiss Federal Assembly Bretscher and Fergler on
Swiss television, Jan. 15, 1967, reported in Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Jan. 18, 1967,
Blatt 5. For a thorough rebuttal of arguments against the lawfulness of the United Na-
tions' action, see McDougal & Reisman, supra note 6, at 5-19.
84 See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
35 This language follows the official interpretation of Swiss neutrality of November
24, 1954. See text accompanying note 59 infra and note 47 infra.
36 The rationale of this decision was that the average of those 3 years was lower than
the import figures of 1964 or 1965, allowed under the Decree of December 17, 1965
(see note 29 supra), and that therefore the Rhodesian courant normal would be fur-
ther reduced. The statistics show that the value of Swiss imports from Rhodesia fell
from $5,678,000 in 1965 to $3,925,000 in 1967. On the other hand, since Switzerland
did not impose any restrictions on exports to Rhodesia (except for arms embargo), the
value of Swiss exports rose slightly from $1,641,000 in 1965 to $1,939,000 in 1967.
See Sixth Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/7781/Add. 5 (June 13, 1968);
Issues Before the 23rd General Assembly, INT'L CONC., Sept. 1968/No. 569, Table 1, at
74.
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ognizing any legal duty to this effect, to prevent the evasion of the
United Nations enforcement measures in its territory. 7
In sum, it appears that Switzerland, acting through the consti-
tutional guardian of her neutrality - the Federal Council"8 - has
formally rejected participation in the collective security measures of
the United Nations on grounds of the incompatibility of such meas-
ures with her status of permanent neutrality. On the other hand,
the decision to take the minimum course of refraining from giving
aid to the offending party shows Switzerland's recognition of the
fact that even a permanently neutral nonmember country cannot, by
adopting the posture of absolute impartiality, completely ignore the
authoritative decision of the collective security organization taken in
the interest of international peace and security.
III. SWITZERLAND - A NONMEMBER STATE
It remains now to examine the Swiss position in more detail,
taking account of the characteristics of permanent neutrality under
international law against the background of the collective security
experience of the League of Nations and the United Nations. One
preliminary point must be clarified in the particular case of Switzer-
land, namely whether the United Nations Charter is binding upon
a nonmember state. This issue has been extensively discussed in
the theory of international law within the context of the legal ef-
fects of treaties upon third parties (the validity of the maxim pacta
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt), and specifically with regard to the
meaning and scope of article 2, paragraph 6 of the Charter of the
United Nations, which lays down that "the Organization shall en-
37 See Communique of the Federal Political Department [undated] (courtesy Swiss
Embassy), Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Sept. 6, 1968, at 33. As an additional concession,
Switzerland promised not to grant any export risk guarantees to firms exporting products
to Rhodesia. See id. For a reiteration of the Swiss position, see the reply of the Federal
Council to interpellation in the National Council of December 17, 1968; Neue Ziir-
cher Zeitung, Dec. 19, 1968, at 27. It is therefore misleading to say that Switzerland
has voluntarily joined the U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia. For such incorrect view,
see Braud, Recherches sur L'Atat tiers en droit international public, 72 REVUE Gh.R.ALE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 17, at 95 n.173 (1968) (referring to Rousseau,
Chronique des faits internationaux, 71 REVUE GtN.RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 486 (1967)). There have been press reports of Swiss firms circumventing the
sanctions, but such reports are not sufficiently documented. See, e.g., Raphael, UN at
sea on Rhodesian Sanctions, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Feb. 13, 1969, at 2. See
also THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, QUARTERLY ECONOMIC REVIEWS: Eco-
NOMIC REVIEW OF RHODESIA, ZAMBIA, MALAWI, No. 1, Feb. 1969, at 4.
"
8 Under article 102(9) of the Swiss Constitution (1874), the Federal Council is
obliged to act as guardian of the external security, independence, and neutrality of
Switzerland. The principle of permanent neutrality itself is not, however, formally
anchored in the Swiss Constitution.
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sure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in
accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security."
It is beyond the scope of this study to enter into the many details
concerning the effects of treaties upon third parties. However, it
can be said in general that the traditional international law rule, as
set forth by the International Law Commission, is that a treaty can-
not impose an obligation on a third state without its consent but
that this does not preclude a rule set forth in a treaty from becom-
ing binding upon a third state as a customary rule of law. 9 The
meaning of article 2, paragraph 6, however, has been a subject of
much controversy. Commentators, for example Swiss publicists, as
well as the Swiss government, believe that this provision creates no
obligations for nonmembers and that therefore nonmember states
cannot be legally required to participate in the enforcement meas-
ures under chapter VII of the Charter." This view seems to provide
additional legal argument for the Swiss in their claim for nonpar-
ticipation in the measures against Rhodesia.4 On the other hand,
Kelsen represents those who believe that paragraph 6 of article 2
directly binds nonmember states and that a permanently neutral
state cannot therefore, by invoking its status of permanent neutral-
ity, refuse to give the United Nations active assistance, in enforce-
ment measures.42 The third group of commentators stresses the re-
39 I.L.C. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, arts. 30, 31, 34; 21 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. 9; U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1, pt. II, ch. II; 61 AM J. INT'L L. 255 (1967). The
I.L.C.'s view is not universally accepted, however. See, e.g., KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 487 n.64 (Tucker ed. 1966); HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
317-318 (1963).
40 See, e.g., Lalive, supra note 4, at 84-86; Bindschedler, supra note 8, at 5-7; GOOD-
RICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 108-09 (2d rev. ed. 1949);
ROBERT, ETUDE SUR LA NEUTRALIT9 SIISSE 66 (1950); Katzarov, Die Stellung der
Nichtmitglieder der Vereinten Nationen, 3 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 1, 20-21
(1950-51); Komarnicki, The Place of Neutrality in the Modern System of International
Law, 80 HAGUE ACADEMY, RECUEIL DES COURS 395, 468 (1952 I); Chaumont, supra
note 4, at 44; Bindschedler, Die Neutralitdt im modernen Volkerrecht, 17 ZEITSCHRIFT
FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1, 9 (1956); Bind-
schedler, La ddlimitation des compctences des Nations Unies, 108 HAGUE ACADEMY,
RECUEIL DES COURS 305, 403-07 (1963 I); 2 DAHM, V6LKERRECHT 181-85 (1961);
SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 160-61, 279 (5th ed.
1967). See also references in 11 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 152-
53 (1968).
41 See Statement by Federal Councillor Spiihler, Head of the Federal Political De-
partment (foreign minister), at a press conference, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Feb. 15, 1967,
Blatt 1. See also Statement of the Federal Council of Dec. 17, 1968, Neue Ziircher
Zeitung, Dec. 19, 1968, at 27.
4 2 See KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS - A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 106-10 (1951). Cf. the position of the Belgian
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quirement of functional effectiveness, according to which the mem-
bers of the United Nations have the obligation to ensure that non-
members act in accordance with the principles of the Charter "so
far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace
and security" and that the nonmembers may be at least prevented
from aiding the specific state against which the United Nations is
taking preventive measures, although they are not required affirma-
tively to engage in the collective measures. 43  In the case of the
Rhodesian sanctions, the principles of functional effectiveness and
proportionality do not require the United Nations to ask more than
abstention from assisting the target of enforcement because the
negligible level of trade relations, which Switzerland is determined
to continue, will not affect the outcome of the enforcement action.44
IV. SWISS PERMANENT NEUTRALITY
It is clear that nonmembership in the United Nations alone
could provide sufficient legal basis for Switzerland's refusal to par-
ticipate in the mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia. However, it
is not nonmembership but the permanent neutrality status that has
provided the Swiss government's basic argument for the claim of
nonparticipation. As the Head of the Federal Political Department
put it, "politically, although not legally, Switzerland faces the same
problems in the Rhodesian situation as a neutral state that is a mem-
ber of the United Nations."4 It remains to be examined what kind
of neutrality the Swiss were referring to in their statement of Febru-
ary 13, 1967, and whether the international law status of Swiss neu-
trality is incompatible with the enforcement measures against
Rhodesia.
delegate at San Francisco, who felt that the organization could ignore claims for non-
participation of nonmembers. See Lalive, supra note 4, at 85-86.
43 See, e.g., 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 407 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955);
2 id. at 119, 652 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952); Chaumont, supra note 4, at 43-44;
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 432-35. See also I.L.C. Draft Declara-
tion on the Rights and Duties of States, art. 10; Report of I.L.C.; 4 G.A., Supp. 10 U.N.
Doc. A/925, at 8 (1949); 44 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 13, 17 (1950).
44 See notes 26 & 36 supra. As it appears from the statistics, the posture of another
nonmember state, the German Federal Republic, might affect the sanctions against
Rhodesia. See general collective security consideration with regard to that country in
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 444. For the position of the German
Federal Republic on the Rhodesian sanctions, see Martens, Zur Frage der.Bindung von
Nichtmitgliedern an die Grundsatze der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen, 7 DER STAAT
431, 432 (1968).
45 Statement of Federal Councillor Spiihler, Head of the Federal Polictical Depart-
ment, before the National Council, June 15, 1967; Neue Zircher Zeitung, June 16,
1967, Blatt 4.
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What the Swiss government meant was, of course, neither the
"neutralist" or "nonaligned" posture in international politics nor -
since no state of war existed in the Rhodesian case - ordinary
("occasional") neutrality, in the meaning of the legal status of a
state which does not participate in a particular war between other
states, and which does not create any rights and duties in peacetime.
Rather, the Swiss meant the "permanent" or "perpetual" neutrality,
sometimes known as "neutralization, ' 46 under which a state is
obliged to remain neutral at all times and which imposes upon that
state certain duties in time of peace as well." In a classical defini-
tion,
[a] neutralized State is a State whose independence and integrity
are for all future time guaranteed by an international convention,
under the condition that such State binds itself never to take up
arms against any other State except for defence against attack, and
never to enter into such international obligations as could indirect-
ly involve it in war.48
Permanent neutrality may be declared unilaterally, in which case it
has no effect under international law, or it may be guaranteed by a
46The term "permanent neutrality" (neutralit permanente) was used for the first
time in the Treaty of Amiens (1802) with regard to the island of Malta. The term
"perpetual neutrality" (neutralitg perpetuelle, immerwahrende Neutralitit) appeared
first in the Declaration of March 20, 1815. See note 49 infira. The term "neutraliza-
tion" appeared for the first time in the Treaty of Paris (1856) with regard to the
neutralization of the Black Sea, but eventually acquired the meaning of permanent
neutrality of a state as well. See VEROSTA, DIE DAUERNDE NEUTRALITAT - EIN
GRUNDRISS 15, 18 (1967).
47 See the official Swiss conception of neutrality, Nov. 26, 1954, in VERWALTUNGS-
ENTSCHEIDE DER BUNDESBEHORDEN AUS DEM JAHR 1954, No. 24, at 9-13 (1954)
[hereinafter citations are to a reprint in 14 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTER-
NATIONALES RECHT 195-99 (1957)]; also in VEROSTA, supra note 46, at 113-17.
48 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 43, at 243. There is quite an extensive international
law literature devoted to the specific topic of permanent neutrality. In addition to the
studies of the Swiss and Austrian cases, the following works can be consulted: WICKER,
NEUTRALIZATION (1911); Strupp, Neutralisation, Beiriedung, Entmilitarisierung,
in 2 HANDBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS (Stier, Somlo & Walz eds. 1933 II); Dol-
lot, Essai sur neutralit permanente, 67 HAGUE ACADEMY, RECUEIL DES COURS 1
(1939 1). Among recent studies, see VEROSTA, supra note 46. For a political approach,
see BLACK, FOLK, KNORR, & YOUNG, NEUTRALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS
(1968). For discussion in treatises of international law, see, eg., 1 FAUCHILLE, TRAITA
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 693-744 (1922 1); 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 107-17 (1947); 1
OPPENHEIM, supra note 43, at 242-50; 2 GUGGENHEIM, TRAITh DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC 547-61 (1954); 1 DAHM, VOLKERRECHT 173-78 (1961); 1 WHITE-
MAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 342-57 (1967); and the literature cited in
these treaties. For the Soviet view, see, e.g., KLIMENKO, DEMILITARIZATSIA I NEI-
TRALIZATSIA V. MEZHDUNARODNOM PRAVE (1963). For a Rumanian view, see Pope-
scu, Institutia neutralizarii in dreptul international contemporan, 20 JUSTITIA NOUA,
No. 7, at 44-53 (1964).
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treaty. The two types can be combined in one state as illustrated by
the case of Switzerland. 49
49 As an official political principle, Swiss neutrality is usually traced to the year
1674 when the Diet of the Swiss Confederation declared that the Confederates should
take a neutral position (Neutralstand) in the war between France and the Netherlands
which had just broken out. BONJOUR, Swiss NEUTRALITY - ITS HISTORY AND
MEANING 11 (Hottinger trans. 1946) (This is an abridged English version of the first
edition of the German original of Bonjour's work.). The principle of the neutrality of
Switzerland had evolved gradually in the course of centuries as a result of a number of
circumstances, both internal and external: the desire to end the policy of territorial ex-
pansion following the defeat at Marignano (1516); preoccupation with the religious
schism which paralyzed the Confederation, making the Swiss realize that neutrality was
the only safeguard against the breakdown of the Confederate system; the tradition of
neutrality by treaty in case of war; the geographical factor; and the development of the
European balance of power system in which the Swiss neutrality played a useful role as
a device in the management of power in the contemporary Europe. BONJOUR, supra
at 11-18. The two basic works on the history of Swiss neutrality are 1-2 SCHWEIZER,
GESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN NEUTRALITAT, (1893-1895), and the more re-
cent, 1-3 BONJOUR, GESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN NEUTRALITAT - DREI
JAHRHUNDERTE EIDGENOSSISCHER AUSSENPOLITIK (1946-1967). See also ROBERT,
ETUDE SUR LA NEUTRALITfI SUISSE (1950); VERGOTrI, LA NEUTRALITt DE LA SUISSE
- SON tVOLUTION HISTORIQUE ET SES ASPECTS DANS LES RELATIONS INTERNATION-
ALES DE LA PREMI RE MOITII DU XXE SIECLE (1954); Sherman, The Neutrality of
Switzerland, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 462, 780 (1918). See also BELIN, LA SUISSE ET
LES NATIONS UNIES 15-37 (1956); HOPER, NEUTRALITY AS THE PRINCIPLE OF
SWISS FOREIGN POLICY 7-14 (Hottinger trans. 1957); CODING, THE FEDERAL GOV-
ERNMENT OF SWITERLAND 152-158 (1961); VEROSTA, supra note 46, at 35-44. For
the general history of permanent neutrality, see Graham, Neutralization as a Move-
ment in International Law, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 79 (1927).
The disruption of the European balance by the French Revolution and the Napoleo-
nic Wars brought a temporary end to Swiss neutrality. The Congress of Vienna, how-
ever, formally recognized the permanent neutrality of Switzerland as part of the restora-
tion of the balance of power in Europe, laying down the foundations for its present-day
"neutralized" status. See BONJOUR, supra at 54-63. See also Sherman, The Permanent
Neutrality Treaties, 24 YALE L. J. 217, 222-33 (1915).
At the request of the Swiss representatives, the eight Congress powers (Austria,
France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and Sweden) issued a declara-
tion on March 20, 1815, to the effect that the "perpetual neutrality" of Switzerland
should be recognized and guaranteed by the participating governments as soon as the
Swiss Diet gave its consent. Declaration of March 20, 1815, Preamble, 2 MARTENS
NOUVEAU RECUEIL 157; 2 B.F.S.P. 142. See also Sherman, supra at 224. The Diet
gave its formal approval on May 27, 1815. Act of Accession, May 27, 1815, 2 MARTENS
NOUVEAU RECUEIL 173; 1 HERTSLET, MAP OF EUROPE BY TREATY 170 (1875).
See also Sherman, supra at 226. Subsequently, article 84 of the Final Act of the Con-
gress of Vienna of June 9, 1815, confirmed the arrangements. The Act of the Congress
of Vienna, June 9, 1815, art. 84; 2 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL 379, 419; 1
HERTSLET, supra at 259-60. Following the final defeat of Napoleon, Austria, France,
Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia signed the Act of Paris of November 20, 1815, de-
claring their "formal and authentic acknowledgment of the perpetual neutrality of
Switzerland" and their guarantee of the integrity and inviolability of Swiss territory.
Act of November 20, 1815, 2 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUBIL 740; 3 B.F.S.P. 359; the
French text is also reproduced in BONJOUR, supra at 154-55; 3 Ai. J. INT'L L. SUPP.
106 (1909). See also LITELL, THE NEUTRALIZATION OF STATES 33-34 (1928). By
virtue of the Act of Paris, Swiss neutrality which until 1815 had been based on the
unilateral policy of the Swiss Confederation, obtained a formal treaty recognition and
became an integral element of European international law.
The treaty recognition of Swiss permanent neutrality was renewed and broadened
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Switzerland has been able successfully to preserve its neutrality
ever since 1815.50 The status of Switzerland as a permanently neu-
tral state has become such a firmly established institution of public
international law that, as found by the International Law Commis-
sion in its comment to article 34 (rules in a treaty becoming binding
through international usage) of the Draft Articles on the Law of
Treaties, the agreements for the neutralization of Switzerland, origi-
nally concluded by a limited number of states, had formulated a
rule which afterwards came to be generally accepted by other states
and became binding upon other states by way of custom.51
Is this institution, as a product of the balance of power system,
compatible with the present-day collective security arrangements of
the international organization? In particular, would Swiss partici-
pation in sanctions against Rhodesia conflict with the duties of a
permanently neutral state? To answer these questions, the content
of the peacetime obligations of Switzerland as a neutralized country
must be explored. According to the official Swiss interpretation, 2
by article 435 of the Versailles Peace Treaty of June 28, 1919, which recognized that
the guarantees stipulated in 1815 constituted "international obligations for the main-
tenance of peace." Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Ger-
many, art. 435; 13 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 151 (1919). Although Switzerland was not
a party to the Treaty of Versailles, the renewal of the guarantees was part of Swiss dip-
lomatic bargain with France under which Switzerland agreed to renegotiate its rights
concerning the neutralization of the French Upper Savoy and Gex, established in 1815,
in return for the renewal of the recognition of Swiss permanent neutrality and its
compatibility with the Covenent of the League of Nations. Cf. text accompanying note
71 infra. The extent of Switzerland's acceptance of article 435 was determined by the
Swiss Note annexed to the article. Since similar provisions were included in three other
peace treaties of the First World War, the number of nations expressly recognizing
and guaranteeing Swiss permanent neutrality was substantially increased. Treaty of
Saint Germain, art. 375; 14 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 176-77 (1920); Treaty of Trianon,
art. 358, 3 MALLOY 3539, 3691; Treaty of Neuilly, art. 291; 14 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp.
185, 302 (1920). See also VEROsTA, supra note 46, at 42. The United States has
never formally recognized the permanent neutrality of Switzerland. On the United
States attitude toward neutralization, see BLACK, FALK, KNORR & YOUNG, supra note
48, at 47-50.
In addition, the Declaration of London of the League of Nations, of February 13,
1920, which considered the problem of Swiss membership in the League expressly
recognized that "the permanent neutrality of Switzerland and the guarantee of the in-
violability of her territory as incorporated in the Law of Nations was justified by the
interests of general peace and as such were compatible with the Covenant." LEAGUE OF
NATIONS OFF. J. 57, 58 (1920). Cf. text accompanying note 71 infra.
'50 For a brief discussion of reasons for this success, see BLACK, FALK, KNORR &
YOUNG, supra note 48, at 38-41.
5' 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9; U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966); 61 AM. J. INT'L L.
255, 375 (1967).
5"2 See the official Swiss conception of neutrality, supra note 47. This conception
is apparently authored by Bindschedler, Chief Legal Adviser to the Federal Political
Department. Cf. identical formulation of the Swiss conception in Bindschedler, Die
Neutralitit im modernen VdIkerrecht, 17 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENT-
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a permanently neutral state has three principal obligations in time
of peace: 53 (1) to abstain from starting a war, except in self-
defense;54 (2) to defend its neutrality; and (3) it must "do every-
thing not to get involved in a war and abstain from anything that
might involve it in a war, that is, it must generally avoid to take
sides in conflicts between third states. It is obliged to follow the
policy of neutrality."55  In the Swiss interpretation, the third set of
duties, the so-called "secondary duties" or "anticipatory effects"
(Vorwirkungen) of permanent neutrality5" are of political, military,
and economic nature. Political neutrality means that Switzerland
must avoid foreign policies that might involve it in hostilities. In
particular, it must not enter into treaties that oblige it to wage war
(for example, alliances, treaties of guarantee, and collective security
agreements). This limitation must, like the others, be interpreted
narrowly; it is restricted to foreign policy commitments proper
and does not include humanitarian, or other non-political actions.
A permanently neutral state is under no obligation to follow the so-
called "moral" neutrality. Individuals are not subject to obliga-
tions following from the status of permanent neutrality; as a result,
neutrality does not call for any limitations on the freedom of the
press. Concerning participation in international conferences and or-
ganizations, the Swiss conception distinguishes between those of
predominantly political and those of predominantly economic, tech-
nical, or cultural nature. Participation in the former may be con-
sidered at best only if they show certain universality and include the
principal representatives of the political groupings, in particular,
both parties to a possible conflict. Here too, Switzerland must avoid
taking sides.5" A neutral state has the right to offer its good offices
LICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1, 4-6 (1956). The Swiss conception is sum-
marized in BLACK, FALK, KNORR & YOUNG, supra note 48, at 22-24.
53 In addition, in time of war a permanently neutral state is bound by the duties of
ordinary neutrality according to the law of neutrality.
54 This obligation implies that permanent neutrality must be armed neutrality. See
KURZ, BEWAFFNETE NEUTRALITAT - DIE MILITARISCHE BEDEUTUNG DER DAUERN-
DEN SCHWEIZERISCHEN NEUTRALITAT (1967).
55 Official Swiss conception of neutrality, supra note 47, at 196.
56 The term Vorwirkungen was coined by Strupp. See Fuchs, supra note 4, at 14
n.3. For a discussion of the anticipatory effects, see id. at 14-17. See also Wengler,
The Meaning of Neutrality in Peacetime, 10 MCGILL L.J. 369 (1964).
57 Official Swiss conception of neutrality, supra note 47, at 196-97. This essential
part of the Swiss conception is misinterpreted in BLACK, FALK, KNORR & YOUNG, supra
note 48, at 23. There, the phrase "participation in a conference or organization with
universal membership is particularly questionable" is an incorrect translation from Ger-
man and tells the reader just the opposite of what the Swiss statement means. The
translation conveys the idea that participation in an organization of limited membership
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and mediation even during hostilities. Military neutrality implies
that a permanently neutral state cannot conclude any military
agreements with other states. Economic neutrality means that it
must not enter into a customs or economic union since such union
might entail, for a weaker neutralized partner, political dependence
upon an economically stronger state and might possibly involve the
neutralized state in a conflict. 8 As pointed out in the Swiss state-
ment, all the duties of a neutral state must, as limitations of
sovereignty, be narrowly interpreted and if Switzerland should
do more than was required by the obligations of neutrality, her ac-
tions should not be regarded as fulfillment of legal duty, but as ac-
tions prompted by political considerations and designed to strengthen
the confidence of the belligerents in the maintenance of neutrality.5"
It must be emphasized that in the official Swiss interpretation
the implementation of the "secondary" duties implied in the policy
of permanent neutrality is within the discretion of the permanently
neutral state. Depending upon the circumstances of the particular
case, it may find that participation in an international undertaking is
or is not compatible with its permanent neutrality. Exercising this
discretionary power, the Swiss government arrived at the conclusion
that in a broader perspective of the case, participation in the eco-
nomic sanctions against Rhodesia would conflict with the third set
of the obligations of a permanently neutral state: to avoid policies
that might involve it in a war and not to take sides in conflicts be-
tween states. This decision was purely political since there is no
doubt that Switzerland could have joined in the sanctions without
thereby violating any rule of international law or her obligations as
a neutralized country. Rhodesia is not a "state" and has not been
recognized as a state by the United Nations or by any nation.60
would be less questionable than participation in a universal organization. The meaning
of the Swiss statement is, of course, that permanent neutrality would be less exposed to
risks of involvement in conflicts and charges of partiality if membership were not limited
but as universal as possible, including antagonistic groupings. Hence it would be par-
ticularly questionable if Switzerland joined a political conference or organization which
would not include representatives of rival political groupings. Thus, for example, in
1954 in its reply to the Soviet invitation to participate in an international conference
on European security, the Swiss Federal Council emphasized that Switzerland could con-
sider the possibility of participating only if all the European countries took part in the
conference. See Bindschedler, supra note 52, at 5 n.3.
58 In this respect the question of the relationship of Switzerland to the European
Economic Community has prompted national debate equalled in its animation only to
the debate on Switzerland and the United Nations.
59 Official Swiss conception of neutrality, supra note 47, at 199.
6o Under international law, a secession results in the creation of a new state only
after the lawful sovereign (in this case the United Kingdom) has given up all attempts
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Neither have the Rhodesian rebels been granted the status of insur-
gency or belligerency since no military action has so far been taken
by the United Kingdom to put down the rebellion. Since Rhodesia
is legally nothing more than a rebel territory under the sovereignty
of the United Kingdom, it could not, of course, charge Switzerland
with the violation of its obligations under the permanent neutrality
status which apply only in the relations with third states. Protests
by other states, such as South Africa or Portugal, do not appear real-
istic. Thus the application of the sanctioning measures, not only
with the consent but also at the request of the lawful sovereign of
Rhodesia could in no way be qualified as conflicting with Swiss
permanent neutrality. On the contrary, one could reason that ab-
solute impartiality, allowing for the evasion via Switzerland of the
sanctions against the rebel territory, could be regarded as at least an
unfriendly act toward the United Kingdom. 61 From the legal point
of view the Rhodesian situation does not call for the fulfillment by
Switzerland of the "secondary obligations" of a permanently neu-
tral state. It was for the above discussed reasons that the Austrian
government complied with the resolutions of the Security Council to
implement the sanctions, subject to reservations mentioned in the
next paragraph.
If the application of the economic sanctions would not, in the
Rhodesian case, conflict with any rule of international law or per-
manent neutrality, why then did Switzerland not fully comply with
the decision of the Security Council? The answer lies in the phrase
"for reasons of principle," used in the Swiss statement of February
13, 1967, which stated Switzerland's position in the Rhodesian
case. 62 Switzerland, and Austria as well, do not want to set a dan-
gerous precedent that would embarass their position as permanently
neutral states in-any future eventuality when economic sanctions
might be applied not against a rebel territory but a recognized state
and a member of the United Nations, such as South Africa or Por-
tugal. In this sense the Rhodesian case is relevant only as a test of
a principle; and for Switzerland, still haunted by the failure of
to recover the territory. See Zemanek, supra note 8, quoting, inter alia, VERDRoss,
VOLKERRECHT 248 (5th ed. 1964). See also McDougal & Reisman, supra note 6,
at 17.
61 On the other hand, some argue that should the Rhodesian rebels eventually win
a possible civil conflict as insurgents, a neutral country (Switzerland) might be charged
by them with the violation of its permanent neutrality by supporting the British govern-
ment. See Bindschedler, supra note 8, at 9.
62 See text accompanying notes 31-37 supra.
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differential neutrality under the League of Nations,"8 "a position of
principle [that is, integral neutrality] must be given priority over
other considerations. '0 4  Departure from this principle could create
a "credibility gap" in the eyes of other states, each one of which, at
least in theory, could become a target of the collective security sys-
tem. As already mentioned, Switzerland is not alone in its concern.
Austria, a neutralized member of the United Nations, complied
with the order of the Security Council but in its reply made a general
reservation concerning its neutrality. It was stated in that reply
that the Austrian decision to implement the sanctions was valid only
"in this particular case and under the given circumstances" and
was taken
without any prejudice to the question of principle whether Austria
as a permanently neutral State Member of the United Nations is
automatically bound by decisions of the Security Council - a ques-
tion which in the opinion of the Federal Government of Austria
can only be decided in each single case on the basis of the specific
situation and with due regard to the obligations which result on the
one hand from the membership of Austria in the United Nations
and on the other hand from its permanent neutrality, which had
previously been notified to all States of the United Nations.0 5
A question might be raised why the Security Council, by using
its discretionary power under article 48, paragraph 1,66 did not re-
lieve the neutralized countries from the participation in the sanc-
tions against Rhodesia. 6  The fact that the target of the current
coercive measures is not a state may be one consideration; but the
primary reason for the all-inclusive call of the Security Council
63 See text accompanying notes 70-79 infra.
64 Statement of Federal Councillor Spiihler, Head of the Federal Political Depart-
ment, Feb. 13, 1967, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Feb. 15, 1967, Blatt 1.
65 Reply of the Austrian Government, Feb. 28, 1967, U.N. Doc. S/7795 (1967).
See also Zemanek, supra note 8, at 27-32. Cf. Declaration of the Austrian delegate in
the 6th Committee of the Gen. Ass., Nov. 21, 1967, U.N. Doc. A.C.6/SR 1000, cited it
Neuhold & Zemanek, Die dsterreichische Neutralitit im Jahre 1967, 8 OSTER-
REICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSSENPOL1TIK 14, 32 (1968).
66 This paragraph reads:
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the members
of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may deter-
mine.
67 Among the commentators on the neutralization of Austria the prevalent opinion
is that should the Security Council decide upon coercive measures under chapter VII of
the Charter, it would have to exempt the neutralized states from the participation in
sanctions conflicting with their permanent neutrality. See, e.g., Verdross, Austria's Per-
manent Neutrality and the United Nations Organization, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 61, 66-67
(1956); Kunz, Austria's Permanent Neutrality, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 418, 424 (1956);
Zemanek, Neutral Austria in the United Nations, 15 INT'L ORG. 408,412 (1961).
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seems to be the fact that it was not the intention of the framers of
the Charter to exempt neutral states from the collective security
duties.68 The decision of the Security Council to include all states in
the community action was taken - like the decision of Switzerland
not to participate - for reasons of principle. The Security Council
decided to uphold the idea of collective security which, after more
than 20 years, was finally given a chance to be implemented against
a threat to international peace. Switzerland was concerned about
asserting its own permanent neutrality approach to international se-
curity. In the particular case of Rhodesia, the conflict between
these two principles could be settled by a compromise. Despite
Switzerland's concern for integral neutrality, that country could not
and did not adopt a posture of absolute impartiality. Such posture
might, in practice, be tantamount to taking sides with Rhodesia since
complete Swiss indifference could easily transform Switzerland into
a "reloading station"69 for the evasion of sanctions.
The restrictive measures taken by Switzerland with regard to
Rhodesia show that even a neutral nonmember country cannot
completely ignore collective security measures adopted by a univer-
sal organization with the concurrence of the great powers and en-
dorsed by the world opinion. Although the Swiss measures seem to
represent a departure from integral neutrality, the Swiss govern-
ment makes it a point to emphasize that they were applied not
within the framework of the policy of neutrality or in compliance
with the United Nations call, but as an expression of an autonomous
discretionary policy of a neutral state. The United Nations, on its
part, has also shown a spirit of compromise in the clash of collec-
tive security against permanent neutrality. Although the Security
Council did not exempt Switzerland from the participation in the
sanctions, no negative reaction followed the Swiss refusal. The ac-
quiescence of the collective security organization in the Swiss posi-
tion can be attributed to four basic factors: (1) the nonmembership
argument cannot be entirely discarded; (2) Swiss permanent neu-
trality, as a time-honored institution of international law, must be
taken into account; (3) Switzerland did fulfill the minimum obli-
gation of refraining from giving assistance to Rhodesia; and (4)
Switzerland's trade relations with the rebel territory cannot signifi-
cantly affect the outcome of the enforcement measures.
68 See text accompanying note 82 infra.
69 In this context the term "reloading" or "re-routing station" (Umschlagplatz) has
been repeatedly used by Swiss government spokesmen.
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V. THE EXPERIMENT IN DIFFERENTIAL NEUTRALITY:
SWITZERLAND AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS'
COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM
The Swiss posture in the Rhodesian issue can be placed in a
much clearer perspective if an account is made of the Swiss experi-
ences during the League of Nations' sanctions against Italy in 1935-
1936. A brief historical look at the early days of the League, when
the problem of Swiss membership in the first collective security or-
ganization arose, is necessary in order to understand the implications
of the Italo-Ethiopian case for the Rhodesian sanctions.
In 1919 for the first time in the history of its neutrality,7° Swit-
zerland faced the question of how to reconcile permanent neutral-
ity with membership in an organization requiring its members to
apply economic sanctions against other states and to permit the pas-
sage of foreign troops through the members' territories. Since this
requirement is incompatible with the obligations of a permanently
neutral state, the Council of the League of Nations in its Declaration
of London of February 13, 1920, affirmed the compatibility of the
unique case of Swiss neutrality with the Covenant of the League as
justified in the interest of general peace, and excused Switzerland
from participation in military sanctions, the preparation of military
enterprises upon its territory, and the grant of free passage to for-
eign troops, while maintaining the obligation to participate in eco-
nomic and financial sanctions under article 16, paragraph 1 of the
Covenant."' Thus Switzerland's entry into the League of Nations
resulted in the restriction of its permanent neutrality by the creation
of the status of "differential" or "qualified" neutrality. The ration-
ale of this concept was that the military aspects of the sanctions
could be separated from the economic ones and that the equality of
treatment and impartiality would apply to the military matters72
70 See note 49 supra, for a brief outline of the history of Swiss neutrality.
71 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 57, 58 (1920). See also note 49 supra. For the
official Swiss position on membership in the League of Nations, see the Message of the
Federal Council, Aug. 4, 1919, [1919 IV) BUNDESBLATT 541; Memorandum of the
Federal Council to the Members of the Council of the League, Jan. 13, 1920, [1920 1)
BUNDESBLATr 354. For a convenient summary of the entry negotiations, see Zahler,
Switzerland and the League of Nations; A Chapter in Diplomatic History, 30 AM.
POL. So. REV. 753 (1936). See also BONJOUR, OFFLER & POTTER, A SHORT HISTORY
OF SWITZERLAND 357-59 (1952); 1 WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NA-
TIONS 92-93 (1952). On May 17, 1920, a referendum was held in which the Swiss
men decided by a narrow margin to join the League of Nations. -See Brooks, Swiss
Referendum on the League of Nations, 14 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 479 (1920).
72 Following this doctrine and invoking the Declaration of London of February 13,
1920, Switzerland refused free passage to the international policing force of 1,500 troops
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but not to the economic ones. That the doctrine of differential
neutrality was a fallacy and a mistake was discovered by Switzerland
15 years later when her neutrality had to face its first severe trial in
the Italo-Ethiopian conflict on the occasion of the League's sanc-
tions against Italy.7"
By 1935 the process of the disintegration of the collective secu-
rity system had started. It became obvious to the Swiss that the deci-
sion to adopt the differential neutrality had been a mistake and that
they had either to enter the collective security system without reser-
vations and thereby abandon neutrality altogether or not to partici-
pate in any collective security measures and return to integral neu-
trality. In the case of the Italian sanctions, the additional problem
for Switzerland was the conflict between international solidarity
and traditionally friendly relations with the target of the sanctions,
Italy, whose attitude towards Switzerland could weigh heavily upon
Switzerland's economy and security. (Fortunately for Switzerland,
this element does not play a role in the present Rhodesian situation.)
Balancing the interests involved, the Swiss government decided to
repudiate its Covenant obligations rather than risk involvement in a
conflict under the circumstances where no sufficient protection
could be expected from the collective security mechanism. As the
Swiss delegate to the Assembly of the League put it, while invoking
the Resolution Concerning the Economic Weapons of 1921 :74
The limits of our obligation are set by our neutrality, which is not
only a fundamental principle of our foreign policy, but a condition
of our existence. We are not of the opinion that we are pledged
to participate in sanctions which, by their nature and effects, might
expose our neutrality to a real danger .... 75
As a result, Switzerland only partially fulfilled its obligations un-
der the Covenant. It joined the embargo on the export of war ma-
terial; but, claiming to be bound by the obligations of the ordinary
neutrality under articles 7 and 9 of the 1907 Hague Convention Re-
specting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
organized by Marshall Foch to supervise the plebiscite in the disputed Polish-Lithuanian
Vilna area. See BONJOUR, supra note 49, at 115.
7 3 See the account in 2 WALTERS, supra note 71, ch. 53. For a recent examination
of Swiss neutrality and the League of Nations sanctions, see GLASL, DIE NEUTRALITAT
DER SCHWEIZ IM SANKTIONSSYSTEM DES VOLKERBUNDES (1967). See also 2 OPPEN-
HEIM, supra note 43, at 646-47, and the literature cited there.
74 League of Nations, Doc. A.14 (1927 V). The Resolution watered down the col-
lective security system of articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant by allowing each state to
decide when it would apply the economic sanctions.
75 Statement of Motta, Oct. 10, 1935, cited in HOFER, supra note 49, at 17.
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Case of War on Land,76 she applied the embargo equally to the ag-
gressor and the victim of aggression and refused to ban imports
from Italy, but stabilized the trade with that country at the level of
1934 (the doctrine of courant normal)." The other two sanction-
ing measures (prohibition of loans and credits and ban on the ex-
port of selected raw materials needed for the Italian war effort)
were complied with.78
Following the general breakdown of the sanctions, the next
logical step for Switzerland was to request formally from the Coun-
cil of the League a release from the obligation to participate in the
economic sanctions in general. This request was granted by the
Council on May 14, 1938,"' and thus after 18 years of collective se-
curity, Switzerland returned to its traditional integral neutrality in
the hope that permanent neutrality rather than collective security or
the compromise device of differential neutrality would better pro-
tect its integrity in the oncoming conflict. Switzerland managed to
preserve its neutrality in World War II owing to a number of rea-
sons among which its integral neutrality status played a prominent
role. The desire to continue this status, strengthened by the memo-
ries of the failure of differential neutrality under the League of Na-
tions, has been a major factor accounting for Switzerland's Rhode-
sian decision in 1967.80
VI. SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS
When a new organization of collective security was established
in 1945, Switzerland again faced problems similar to those that had
confronted it following the First World War. The question of
joining the United Nations was studied by a number of govern-
mental committees and became a subject of the first round of the
national "grand debate" on this issue. Details concerning the events
and circumstances which eventually led to the decision not to apply
for admission to the United Nations are beyond the scope of this
6 36 Stat. 2310 (1910), T.S. No. 540.
77 See text accompanying note 29 supra.
78 See Fuchs, supra note 4, at 85-89; BELIN, supra note 49, at 53.
79 Resolution of the Council, May 14, 1938, LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 369, 375,
385 (1938). See also Morgenthau, The End of Switzerland's "Differential" Neutrality,
32 AM. J. INT'L L. 558 (1938).
80 See, e.g., Statement of Spiuhler, Head of the Federal Political Department at the
press conference, following the announcement of the Swiss decision in the Rhodesian
question, Feb. 13, 1967; Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Feb. 15, 1967, Blatt 1.
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discussion .8  The primary consideration for the decision was the ap-
parent incompatibility of permanent neutrality with the system of
collective security of the new organization and the belief that mem-
bership with exemption from participation in the enforcement meas-
ures under chapter VII of the Charter was not possible in view of
the generally hostile attitude toward neutrality, whether occasional
or permanent, displayed at the drafting of the Charter.82 On the
other hand, Switzerland decided that the application of article 94,
paragraph 2, of the Charter, concerning the execution of judg-
ments of the International Court of Justice,8" did not conflict with
the obligations of permanent neutrality and became a party to the
Statute of the Court in 1947.84 In accordance with its conception of
81 The records of the committees studying the question of Swiss membership have
not been published by the Swiss government. Only succinct summaries are included in
the Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on its activities in 1945.
For a most detailed account of the issue of Swiss membership in the United Nations in
the years 1944-1947, see EHNI, DIE SCHWEIZ UND DIE VEREINTEN NATIONEN VON
1944-1947 (1967). See also BELIN, supra note 49 at 71-82; CODDING, supra note 49,
at 162.
82 The question of neutrality was discussed at San Francisco by Committee I/1 in
connection with the crucial collective security obligation in article 2, paragraph 5 of
the Charter which reads:
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action
it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive
or enforcement action.
The French delegate proposed an amendment which would have expressly denied to any
member the right to be relieved from the provisions of this paragraph on the ground of
neutrality by which, as he explained, permanent neutrality was meant. In the discus-
sion in Subcommittee I/i/A it was understood that permanent neutrality was incom-
patible with the principles of article 2, paragraphs 5-6 of the Charter (cf. text accom-
panying notes 40-44 supra) without it being necessary to mention it expressly. Doc.
739, I/1/A/19(a), 6 U.N.C.I.O. DOCS. 722 (1945); Doc. 944, 1 1/34 (I), at 14-15,
459-60. See also KELSEN, supra note 42, at 94; GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 40,
at 108; Lalive, supra note 4, at 77-78; 11 WHITEMAN, supra note 40, at 146-47. As
noted by Lalive (supra) in the view of its author the French amendment related only to
the status of permanent neutrality whereas the text would seem to cover occasional neu-
trality as well. The position of the French delegate was understandable since the Char-
ter leaves a number of possibilities for the occasional neutrality, the discussion of which
is beyond the scope of this study. For a recent comment on this question, see Fenwick,
Is Neutrality Still a Term of Present Law?, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 100 (1969).
83 Article 94, paragraph 2 reads:
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it
under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to
the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommenda-
tions or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
84 [1947-1948] I.C.J.Y.B. 30, 31. See also Message of the Federal Council, July 8,
1947, [1947 II] BUNDESBLATT 510; Hudson, Switzerland and the International Court
of Justice, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 867 (1947); Hagemann, Der Beitritt der Schweiz zum
Statut des Internationalen Gerichtshofes und die schweizerische Neutralitlit, 5 SCHWEIZ-
ERISCHES JAHRBUCH FUR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 117 (1948).
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permanent neutrality,8 5 Switzerland has also joined a number of
specialized agencies of the United Nations and participates in the
work of other nonpolitical bodies of the Organization.'" It is in-
teresting to note, however, that Switzerland accepted membership
in the International Atomic Energy Agency on the express reserva-
tion that it would not be bound by any decision of the Security
Council in the area of atomic energy that might impinge upon its
status of permanent neutrality. A reservation of permanent neu-
trality was also made by Switzerland upon its accession to the Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organization.87 Since 1946
Switzerland has been maintaining a permanent observer at the
United Nations Headquarters in New York and since 1966 at the
European Headquarters in Geneva.88 The fact that the latter is lo-
cated in Switzerland is not considered to conflict with the obliga-
tions of permanent neutrality. Switzerland has made significant
contributions to the United Nations peace-keeping operations which
are regarded in harmony with the impartial role a neutral country
should play in world affairs.8"
85 See text accompanying notes 52-59 supra.
80 A list of the principal agencies and bodies in which Switzerland participates is
found in Schweiz und UNO: Unsere Mitarbeit in den Organen und in den Spezialor-
ganisationen der Weltorganisation (Feb. 1968) [mimeographed press release of the
Swiss Federal Political Department). For the latest report on Swiss cooperation in the
specialized agencies and other United Nations bodies, see BERICHT DES BUNDESRATES
AN DIE BUNDESVERSAMMLUNG UBER SEINE GESCHAFTSFUHRUNG IM JAHRE 1967 at
43-44 (Apr. 3, 1968). See also Zwicky, Switzerland's Participation in International
Organizations: A Summary, 18 SwISS REV. WORLD AFFAIRS, No. 2, at 18-20 (May
1968); PERRIN, LA NEUTRALITh PERMANENTE DA LA SUISSE ET LES ORGANISATIONS
INTERNATIONALES 58-60 (1964).
8 7 See Guggenheim, Neutralitit und die Entwicklung der UN, in KANN UND SOLL
DIE SCHWEIZ DEN VEREINIGTEN NATIONEN BEITRETEN? 35, 44 (1966).
8 8 On the observers' status, see Mower, Observer Countries: Quasi Members of the
United Nations, 20 INT'L ORG. 266 (1966).
89 Switzerland is still a member of the U.N. Armistice Commission in Korea. See
BERICHT DES BUNDESRATES AN DIE BUNDESVERSAMMLUNG UBER SEINE GESCHAFTS-
FLJHRUNG IM JAHRE 1967, at 23 (Apr. 3, 1968). Among the Swiss contributions to
peacekeeping operations are the following: In 1956 Switzerland, at its own expense of
1.6 million SF, transported U.N. contingents from Italy to Egypt. At the time of the
U.N. operation in the Congo, it provided aircraft for the transport of food and of a small
number of troops, at the cost of 1.8 million SF. Other expenses incurred by Switzer-
land in the Congo (civilian specialists) amounted to 4.1 million SF. In addition, Swit-
zerland maintains a hospital in the Congo at the cost of 1.1 million SF per year. In 1961
it made a loan to the U.N. at the amount of 8.2 million SF. Other Swiss contributions
to the U.N. peacekeeping include participation in the cost of the Cyprus operation, pro-
viding aircraft and some personnel for the truce supervision teams in Palestine, and as-
sistance rendered the U.N. observers in Saigon in 1963. For details see Schweizerische
Mitwirkung an friedenserhaltenden Aktionen der UNO [mimeographed press release
of the Federal Political Department March 1968) (courtesy Swiss Consulate in Cleve-
land, Ohio).
1969]
CASE W. RES. 1. INT'L L.
The disrepute in which neutrality was held at San Francisco was
reflected in the doctrine of international law in the early post-war
years: the opinion prevailed that neutrality was incompatible with
the Charter, the view that only corroborated the Swiss decision not
to join the United Nations. There were, however, dissenting voices,
among them some Swiss commentators, who pointed, in part, to the
possibilities afforded by article 48, paragraph 1, of the Charter un-
der which Switzerland could be exempted from the enforcement
measures by the Security Council. ° Further developments showed
clearly that neutrality was possible for other reasons as wellY1 As a
result of the breakdown in unity of the great powers and the ap-
plication of the veto in the Security Council, the collective security
system, as envisaged in 1945, failed to work. As a corollary of
this development, "the curve . . . of permissible nonparticipation
rose,"9' 2 showing that neutrality remained in the contemporary world
politics and under the Charter even if the United Nations worked
normally. The best evidence of the reevaluation of neutrality was
the recognition of the neutralization of Austria by the great powers
and a unanimous admission of that country into the United Nations
without any formal discussion whether the status of the per-
manent neutrality of Austria, modeled on the Swiss example, was
compatible with membership in the United Nations, but also with-
out any formal recognition of Austria's neutrality. 8
The failure of the collective security system based on coercive
and legally binding measures and the trend towards alternative
methods of voluntary "peacekeeping" and "preventive diplomacy'""
has again raised in Switzerland the old question of a possible mem-
bership in the United Nations. A national debate ensued95 in
which the possibility of making Swiss military contingents available
90 See note 66 supra. See also Lalive, supra note 4, at 83.
91 The discussion of this problem by far exceeds the scope of this study. For a re-
view of the situations in which claims to neutrality in the case of an international con-
flict might be permissible under the Charter, see 11 WHITEMAN, supra note 40, at 139-
60. See also Fenwick, supra note 82.
92 MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 128-29.
93 Among the many studies on Austria's membership in the United Nations, see
STRASSER, OSTERREICH IN DEN VEREINTEN NATIONEN - EINE BESTANDSAUF-
NAHME VON ZEHN JAHREN MITGLIEDSCHAFT (1967). See also Kunz, supra note 67;
Verdross, supra note 67; Verdross, La neutralitg dans le cadre de l'ONU, particuli~rement
celle da la Republique d'Autriche, 61 REVUE G NIRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 177 (1957); VERDROSS, DIE IMMERWAHRENDE NEUTRALITAT DER REPUBLIK
OSTERREICH (1966); Zemanek, supra note 67.
94 See CLAUDE, supra note 2, ch. 14.
9 5 See note 27 supra.
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to the United Nations was also envisioned. 0 A special govern-
mental commission was established to study the perspectives and
possibilities of joining the United Nations while maintaining the
permanent neutrality.97
In the midst of all this debate calling for a "more active foreign
policy" and at the time when the United Nations appeared to have
departed enough from the system of collective security to make it
possible for Switzerland to consider membership in the Organiza-
tion, the Rhodesian decision of the Security Council had a sobering
effect upon the Swiss speculations. The decision showed that there
were areas, outside of the spheres of influence of the great powers,
where the coercive measures of chapter VII of the Charter could be
applied. An editorial in Neue Ziircher Zeitung reflected the new
mood in Switzerland best:
Unexpectedly, the U.N. has resorted to those possibilities of its
Charter that make the neutrals rack their brains and put them on
the spot; unexpectedly, the "pays reel," the landscape of realities,
is changing into "pays legal" which some observers regarded as
only abstract constructions. This transformation will hardly make
things easier for us.98
CONCLUSIONS
As a result of the Security Council decision imposing mandatory
economic sanctions upon the rebel regime of Southern Rhodesia,
Switzerland's permanent neutrality was exposed to a difficult test.
It confronted that neutralized nonmember state with the dilemma of
how to reconcile the principle, which for centuries had been the
fundamental tenet of Swiss foreign policy, with a collective secu-
rity action of the United Nations' Security Council which called up-
on all states to participate in the enforcement measures. Owing to
the unique circumstances of the Rhodesian case, Switzerland has
been able to find a compromise solution to its dilemma which satis-
96 See, e.g., Statement of the Head of the Federal Political Department in the Na-
tional Council, June 6, 1966, and his address at the University of Lausanne, Oct. 21,
1966. See also the statement of the former Head of the Political Department, Wahlen;
Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Feb. 9, 1967, Blatt 5.
9 See motion by Bretscher in the National Council, June 15, 1967; BERICHT DES
BUNDESRATES AN DIE BUNDESVERSAMMLUNG UBER SEINE GESCHAFTSFUHRUNG IM
JAHRE 1967, at 38 (Apr. 3, 1968). See also N.Y. Times, June 18, 1967, at 14, cols. 1-2.
The Report of the Commission is expected to appear in the spring of 1969.
98 Editorial, Kann sich die Schweiz beteiligen?, Neue Ziircher Zeitung, Dec. 24,
1966, Blatt 1.
Public opinion polls conducted in 1967 indicated diminished interest in the question
of joining the United Nations. Even in Geneva a majority of people interrogated were
against joining. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1967, at 14, col. 5.
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fied both the obligations of a permanently neutral country and the
expectations of the international community in the era of collective
security... In order not to set a precedent for any future cases,
Switzerland refused "for reasons of principle" to comply with the
sanctions decision and thus upheld its'permanent neutiality status.
On the other hand, realizing that it could not remain totally impar-
tial in defiance of the Organization and the united front of the
great powers and world public opinion, it adopted, independently
and in the exercise of free discretion, certain restrictive measures
against Rhodesia whih satisfied the minimum requirement of re-
fraining from giving .assistance to the target of the collective security
measures. .The United Nations has tacitly accepted the Swiss re-,.
sponse recognizing thereby. the validity of the Swiss posture'under
international law.
The solution presented does not mean that permanent neutrality
and collective security can always be reconciled. On the contrary,
permanent neutrality and collective security as it is conceived in the
Charter of the United Nations are, in principle, incompatible be-
cause the "secondary" obligations of a permanently neutral State to
observe political neutrality in peacetime conflict with membership
in an organization imposing upon its members the duty to partici-
pate in coercive measures against other states and possibly place
them in other situations which could be interpreted as taking sides in
political conflicts, and because the obligations of a neutralized state
under the Charter prevail over the obligations of that state under
the neutralization treaty. A permanently neutral state, such as
Switzerland, could become a member of the United Nations and not
jeopardize its status if the Security Council acting under article 48,
paragraph 1, and possibly the General Assembly, would grant it full
exemption from affirmative participation in the enforcement meas-
ures under chapter VII of the Charter. The permanently neutral
country would, however, be obliged to refrain from giving assist-
ance to the aggressor to the extent compatible with its neutralized
status. A more permanent solution would be to anchor the above
mentioned principles in the Charter by an amendment under article
108.
The exemption of neutralized states from participation in coer-
cive measures could be far outweighed by the positive and construc-
tive role that they could play as representatives of the United Na-
tions in the peace-keeping operations of the Organization.
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